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BOOK REVIEWS 473
and an attempt to integrate these game-
theoretic models into Leibenstein's framework
would have improved the book significantly.
What Leibenstein deems to be non-maximizing
conventions such as peer group pressure or
fixed-wage contracts may actually be optimiz-
ing behavior in the face of informational
constraints.
Leibenstein implies that a source of U.S.
inefficiency is the hierarchical organization of
firms. Although there may be gains from
specialization within a firm, he argues that
there are significant costs associated with
hierarchies as well. For example, there are
problems in coordinating activities across units,
potential confiicts between managers' self-
interest and the company's interest, and fac-
tionalism.
A less rigid hierarchical structure within the
Japanese firm, according to Leibenstein, is one
of the reasons that Japanese firms apparently
perform more successfully than firms in the
United States. For example, there are fewer
distinctions between workers and managers in
Japan. Further, he argues that several other
aspects of Japanese employment systems are
particularly advantageous: the lifetime employ-
ment ideal; the small number of job bound-
aries; and fiexible compensation. He also
argues, however, that the Japanese manage-
ment system is not wholly responsible for
Japanese success; also playing an important
part are cultural values, such as loyalty.
It would have been helpful if more attention
had been paid to the difficult question of the
degree to which the Japanese management
system is exportable. In my opinion, results
from game theory suggest that at least some of
the benefits of the Japanese system may be
transferable. Specifically, game theorists have
shown that under some circumstances, cooper-
ation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
(the situation that Leibenstein believes charac-
terizes much of industry) is more likely the
longer the participants' time horizons and the
lower their discount rates (Friedman, above).
Such is the case when there are short-term
gains to both sides from noncooperative behav-
ior, but longer-term losses. Long time horizons
appear to be a major characteristic of Japanese
workers and firms, and it is conceivable that
time horizons in other countries could be
affected by the policies of their governments.
As my discussion of game theory and
allusion to efficiency wage and implicit contract
theories suggest, many of the phenomena that
Leibenstein labels as non-maximizing are con-
sistent with maximizing models of behavior. Of
course, the existence of such theories does not
prove that conventions, inertia, and the like are
the result of optimizing choices. But even if
these theories receive empirical confirmation,
Leibenstein is to be commended for pointing
us toward a subject that has received insuffi-
cient attention from economists—the internal
workings of firms. Further, his discussion of
the problems of coordination and incentives
suggests the important general implication that
cost minimization may be a very difficult goal
for any firm to achieve.
Lawrence M. Kahn
Professor of Economics and
Labor and Industrial Relations
University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign
Incentives, Cooperation and Risk Sharing:
Economic and Psychological Perspectives on
Employment Contracts. Edited by Haig R.
Naibantian. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1987. xvi, 239 pp.
A recent Industrial Relations Research Asso-
ciation volume paper that George Milkovich
and I co-authored concluded that although
various theories exist about the effects of
compensation policies and why these policies
might vary across firms, there is litde empirical
evidence either on the determinants of com-
pensation policies or on whether these policies
have desired incentive effects at the individual,
corporate, or macroeconomic level. In the last
few years, however, compensation policies and
their effects have begun to attract the attention
of many industrial relations researchers, and a
forthcoming special issue of the Industrial and
Labor Relations Review will be devoted to this
topic.
The current volume, which grew out of a
two-day conference held at New York Univer-
sity in 1984, is an excellent introduction to
compensation policy research and practice. A
unique aspect of the volume is its interdiscipli-
nary orientation; the contributors include aca-
demic economists and industrial psychologists,
as well as practicing compensation and person-
nel and human resource specialists. A very
readable introductory essay by the editor
provides general discussion of analytical issues
in compensation policy research and whets the
reader's appetite for the papers that follow.
The volume is divided neatly into four parts.
In the first, nontechnical discussions of eco-
nomic models of incentives and risk sharing
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and of supervision are presented by Joseph
Stiglitz and Guillermo Calvo, respectively. Both
authors provide excellent summaries of the
literature and trace the implications of their
respective models for firms' compensation
policies. A paper by Edward Lawler III also
appears in this section and deals with concep-
tual issues relating to pay systems from the
perspective of an industrial psychologist.
The second part of the book summarizes
what we know about the effects of incentive
systems. Richard Guzzo and Raymond Katzell
review research by psychologists, and John
Kendrick reviews research on profit-sharing
and gain-sharing. Although these two chapters
introduce the reader to the literature, they
unfortunately are quite uncritical and fail to
point out substantial methodological weak-
nesses in many of the reviewed studies.
Andrew Weiss reports some of his own
research on the effects of individual wage
incentives, group incentives, and seniority-
based incentive systems in the section's third
paper. The section concludes with a reprinted
paper by practitioners Jude Rich and John
Larson that discusses why some long-term
executive incentive compensation systems fail
to have intended effects.
The third part of the book examines issues in
the design of incentive compensation systems.
A paper by a practitioner (Sarah Armstrong)
dealing with the actual experiences of one
large firm is usefully paired with a nontech-
nical paper by an economic theorist (Bengt
Holmstrom) that deals with the design of
executive compensation systems from a theo-
retical perspective.
The volume's final section focuses on macro-
economic issues. Economists John Taylor,
Martin Weitzman, and Clive Bull deal, respec-
tively, with the structure of labor contracts in
the United States, macroeconomic aspects of
profit sharing, and evidence of the current
flexibility of wages over the business cycle.
Incentives, Cooperation and Risk Sharing should
be of interest to a wide spectrum of the ILR
Review's readers. It is an excellent introduction
to issues relating to incentive effects of com-
pensation systems, and the editor and authors
obviously have gone to great lengths to make it
very accessible to nonspecialists. In spite of the
shortcomings I have noted in a few of its
essays, it is well worth reading.
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial
and Labor Relations and Economics
Cornell University
Working Together to Get Things Done; Man-
aging for Organizational Productivity. By
Dean Tjosvold. Lexington, Mass.: D. C.
Heath, 1986. xiv, 207 pp.
Team work is a management "buzz" word of the
1980s, along with organizational culture and flexi-
bility. This book is a blueprint for the use of teams
as a basis of organization. Tjosvold relies on a
review of social psychology research to under-
stand how teams function and to argue that they
are a superior basis for structuring the manage-
ment process of an organization. The material
reviewed focuses on expectancy theories of mo-
tivation and group process research.
The fundamental premise is that coopera-
tion provides far better motivation for employ-
ees than does competition. Tjosvold argues
that cooperation functions best in group
situations, and that the result of team-based
cooperation is greater productivity, more inno-
vation, and integration of individuals into the
organization by acceptance of group goals.
Organizations must be restructured to aban-
don hierarchy, make power a positive force,
and channel group conflict to reach sound
solutions to managerial problems. In such a
system, status differences should be reduced
and employees at all levels brought together in
production and human resource policy teams.
Tjosvold reviews important issues, such as
the use of power in team work situations, and
does so without the use of academic jargon or
excessive text citations. The style reflects his
intention of reaching managers as well as
academics and management educators. The
purpose of reaching both audiences, however,
results in the usual ambivalent presentation. Is
this research, or a "how to" book for managers?
Tjosvold's strong advocacy of team work leads
him to cite research selectively and to weight
the book heavily with normative material. Each
chapter, for example, contains sections giving
summary advice to managers ("Guides to
Action" and "Steps to . . . "). Diagrams
illustrating the flow of teamwork processes are
confusing.
It is difficult to think of a sound use for this
book. Tjosvold's aim of summarizing academic
research to provide a basis for practical
application is commendable; translating aca-
demic work for application is a crucial task.
The book's partially academic style, however,
makes it unlikely reading for the popular
management market. Furthermore, the mate-
rial is presented in such a simplified form that
researchers will not find it useful and would
probably argue with several of the principle

